Contrary to what most interpreters hold, in the "Nicomachean Ethics" Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The present paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as "incurable", he does not mean that (...) they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform. (shrink)

Contrary to what most interpreters hold, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not committed to the view that people of established vicious character could never become good. The present paper proves this result (1) by giving a better reading of 1114 a 12-21, a passage which has traditionally been taken to assert that unjust and self-indulgent people are doomed to a lifetime of vice; (2) by showing that when Aristotle refers to self-indulgent people as "incurable", he does not mean that (...) they could never change, but only that they could not change as a result of external influences such as persuasion or punishment; (3) by proving that although Aristotle regards the desires of vicious people as determined by their character, there is room within Aristotelian moral psychology for the possibility that people of corrupt character become motivated to begin a process of moral reform. (shrink)

Gianluca Di Muzio develops a novel objection to theism.

With the exception of pornography, the morality of popular forms of entertainment has not been studied extensively by philosophers. The present paper aims to start discussion on the moral status of horror films, whose popularity and success has grown steadily since the 1970s. In particular, the author focuses on so-called “slasher” or “gorefest” films, where the narration revolves around the graphic and realistic depiction of a series of murders. The paper’s main thesis is that it is immoral to produce, distribute, (...) and view films of this kind. The reasons are traced back to two facts: 1) living the moral life requires being disposed to react compassionately to the sight of human victimization, and 2) the most violent horror films either overwhelm the spectator or promote a detachment from violence that may interfere with the development and maintenance of the correct reactive attitudes to human victimization. (shrink)

Theists are inclined to assert that human life would be meaningless if there was no personal immortality and God did not exist. The present paper aims to evaluate the truth of this claim. The author first explores the conception of meaning that is at the roots of the theistic position. After pointing out some difficulties with it, the author shows that, on a plausible alternative interpretation of what it is for an activity to have meaning, human life would fully qualify (...) as meaningful even if it were not inscribed in a universal divine plan. (shrink)

This paper shows that a recent, simplified version of St. Anselm's proof of the existence of God has its flank open to Gaunilo's objection. Reformulating Anselm's line of reasoning in terms of the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers, as the simplified proof does, makes it harder for Anselm's supporters to refute the objection that the ontological argument absurdly entails the existence of all kinds of fictional entities.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that Christians should incorporate the theory of reincarnation into their belief system. The problem of the apparent disproportion between finite human sin and infinite punishment in Hell becomes far more tractable against the background of reincarnation. In the second part of the paper, I address and answer three objections that may be raised against a Christian theory of reincarnation. The first objection is based on the role of memory in identity, the (...) second points to the essential unity of body and soul, and the third revolves around the suggestion that living multiple lives may more easily lead to damnation than to salvation. (shrink)

Although several scholars have held that the Greeks and the Romans viewed abortion as morally unproblematic, an examination of three ancient texts reveals that, starting around the first century CE, some Greek and Roman writers were willing to explore reasons for opposing abortion on ethical grounds. The three texts introduce a form of opposition to abortion that has come to be known in our time as the future-like-ours argument against abortion. The present paper explores the argument that emerges from the (...) three ancient texts and compares it to the work of Don Marquis, the best-known contemporary defender of a future-like-ours argument against abortion. The comparison reveals significant similarities, which are ultimately attributable to a common set of intuitions about what makes killing wrong and premature death tragic. (shrink)

Did Aristotle believe that upbringing determines character, and character, in turn, determines action? Some scholars answer this question in the affirmative and thus read Aristotle as a determinist with little use for the idea that people are morally responsible for what they do. The present paper counters this interpretation by showing that a deterministic reading of Aristotle’s theory of action and character is indefensible in the face of the text. The author points to three main facts: (1)a passage in the (...) Nicomachean Ethics shows conclusively that Aristotle did not regard upbringing as determining moral character; (2) the doctrine of character expounded in Nicomachean Ethics III does not entail that people can only act in conformity with their moral dispositions, and (3) Aristotle viewed alternatepossibilities as genuinely open to moral agents, not as available to them only in principle (i.e., if they had received a different upbringing or had had different beliefs and desires). (shrink)

Did Aristotle believe that upbringing determines character, and character, in turn, determines action? Some scholars answer this question in the affirmative and thus read Aristotle as a determinist with little use for the idea that people are morally responsible for what they do. The present paper counters this interpretation by showing that a deterministic reading of Aristotle’s theory of action and character is indefensible in the face of the text. The author points to three main facts: (1)a passage in the (...) Nicomachean Ethics shows conclusively that Aristotle did not regard upbringing as determining moral character; (2) the doctrine of character expounded in Nicomachean Ethics III does not entail that people can only act in conformity with their moral dispositions, and (3) Aristotle viewed alternatepossibilities as genuinely open to moral agents, not as available to them only in principle (i.e., if they had received a different upbringing or had had different beliefs and desires). (shrink)

Since God is perfect, he should never have a reason for changing his mind. However, some biblical passages describe God as modifying his chosen course of action in response to prayer. How could human prayers ever be efficacious if God’s mind is always independently set on doing what is best? This article examines contemporary attempts to answer the question by emphasizing the benefits of prayer for the petitioner. After exposing some difficulties with this solution, the author proposes that one can (...) overcome the problem of petitionary prayer by reflecting on the relationship God wishes to develop with his human creatures. From this vantage point, one can see that God’s willingness to change his mind in response to prayer proceeds from his free decision to accept his human creatures’ input as he partners with them to realize his plan for the world. (shrink)

The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus regarded his atomism as a cure for the fear of natural phenomena. An atomistic philosophy, however, can easily lead to determinism and epiphenomenalism, which threaten human happiness even more than the fear of nature. The present paper attempts to reconstruct Epicurus’ strategy for dealing with the unwanted consequences of his atomism. The author argues that Epicurus employed a form of emergentism about properties to show that freedom exists and mental states are not causally inert epiphenomena.

The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus regarded his atomism as a cure for the fear of natural phenomena. An atomistic philosophy, however, can easily lead to determinism and epiphenomenalism, which threaten human happiness even more than the fear of nature. The present paper attempts to reconstruct Epicurus’ strategy for dealing with the unwanted consequences of his atomism. The author argues that Epicurus employed a form of emergentism about properties to show that freedom exists and mental states are not causally inert epiphenomena.

The passing of the French law that prohibits face coverings, such as the Islamic burqa, in public places ignited a complex philosophical and legal debate. Participants in the debate have typically focused on the boundaries between individual and religious liberties, on the one hand, and state-imposed limitations on public behaviors, on the other. The author of this paper wishes to introduce a change in perspective by concentrating instead on the duties immigrants have to the citizens of the countries that host (...) them. The author finds that, under certain circumstances, immigrants may have a moral duty to conform to the ethical preferences of the communities they have come to live and interact with. (shrink)

The present dissertation explores the Aristotelian notion of the bekousion. This notion---together with its opposite, the akousion---assumes center stage in those parts of Aristotle's ethical works where he examines the conditions under which an action is open to moral evaluation. It also plays an important role in Nicomachean Ethics III 5, where Aristotle argues that people are the makers of their own character. The main aim of the dissertation is to show that Aristotle's use of "bekousion" and "akousion " to (...) qualify actions reflects considerations of moral responsibility, and that these, in turn, answer to principles that are themselves moral, and not just metaphysical. Proving this result is philosophically significant because a number of prominent contemporary philosophers have understood moral evaluation as a two-step procedure. That is, they believe, non-moral critertia---especially causal criteria---serve to determine whether an individual is responsible for an action; and it is only after this first step, and depending on the results it yields, that moral considerations about the action come into play. Aristotle's treatment of topics such as action, duress, and the formation of character exposes the error of this position by clarifying that ascriptions of moral responsibility always presuppose a moral context, and are in large measure independent of causal considerations. (shrink)

Gianluca Di Muzio develops a novel objection to theism.

In this article, I focus on what emerges from Thomas Aquinas’s religious epistemology once taken into consideration in the light of the contemporary debates on Christian philosophy. I argue that Aquinas profitably explores what is specific to Christian faith – its being under the command of the will moved by God’s grace. According to Aquinas, it seems that it is precisely that which is specific to faith and distinguishes it from human reason that puts believers in an ideal condition (...) to develop intellectual activities. (shrink)

This book offers a new reading of Aquinas' views on faith. The author argues that the theological nature of faith is crucial to Aquinas' thought, and that it gives rise to a peculiar and otherwise incomprehensible relationship with reason. The first part of the book examines various modern and contemporary accounts of the relationship between faith and reason in Aquinas' thought. The author shows that these accounts are unconvincing because they exhibit what he calls a Lockean view of faith and (...) reason, which maintains that the relationship in question should only be treated by way of evidence. In other words, this view ignores the specific nature of the Christian faith and the equally specific way it needs to relate to reason. The second part offers a comprehensive account of Aquinas' view of faith. It focuses on the way the divine grace and charity shape the relationship between evidence and human will. The final part of the book ties these ideas together to show how Christian faith, with its specifically theological nature, is perfectly compatible with rational debates. It also argues that employing the specificity of faith may constitute the best way to promote autonomous and successful rational investigations. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas, philosophy of religion, Christian theology, and medieval philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the (...) theologian – not the philosopher – is entitled to deal with a-rational commitments, because the truths of faith can be seen as simply intellectual – like the rational statements considered by the philosopher – but also as decisions made by way of divine grace. I also suggest that Pritchard's thesis may be re-proposed on a new basis, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy. (shrink)

[ita] L'articolo analizza la concezione della grazia nel pensiero del teologo milanese Carlo Colombo. Egli affronta tale tema con la consueta tendenza alla sintesi e alla moderazione, confrontando soprattutto le tesi di Tommaso d'Aquino e del Molina e adottando una soluzione che salvi al tempo stesso la giustizia di Dio e il suo essere Mistero ineffabile. -/- [eng] The article analyzes the conception of grace in the thought of the Milanese theologian Carlo Colombo. He deals with this theme with (...) the usual tendency to synthesis and moderation, above all comparing the theses of Tommaso d'Aquino and Molina and adopting a solution that at the same time saves the justice of God and his being ineffable mystery. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity by Roberto Di CeglieGregory StaceyDI CEGLIE, Roberto. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity. New York: Routledge, 2022. x + 196 pp. Cloth, $160.00Suppose one wishes to argue that Christian faith (that is, supernatural belief in propositions insofar as they are divinely revealed) is compatible with the proper exercise of reason (that is, forming beliefs through natural cognitive processes). Two strategies suggest themselves. (...) First, one could argue that faith is itself a natural cognitive process or else meets criteria by which natural beliefs are considered rational or appropriate. Alternatively, one might contend that faith can meet its own, independent criteria for rationality or propriety. Thomas Aquinas, whose natural theology and discussion of public evidence that God has revealed himself in Christ are famously robust, may appear to be an exponent of the former strategy. Yet in this volume, Roberto Di Ceglie advances a reading of Thomas that illustrates how faith can support rational enquiry, while remaining independent of it. On this view, faith is "caused mainly by God" and is therefore "at least partly unresponsive to rational criteria."Part 1 begins Di Ceglie's case obliquely, by criticizing both efforts to argue (following Gilson and Maritain) that philosophy can be influenced by Christian faith and recent attempts to explain Aquinas's account of faith and reason. Reviewing the work of commentators including Anthony Kenny, Richard Swinburne, and Eleonore Stump, the author objects that many philosophers hold that for Thomas, faith is primarily a form of propositional belief that should be evaluated for propriety in the same way as natural beliefs. He alleges that this understanding of faith is inherited from Locke, who endorsed "methodological naturalism": the view that appropriate "religious belief can only be taken as the outcome, if any, of a rational exploration of our experience." While this material usefully outlines views which Di Ceglie means to oppose, readers unfamiliar with scholarship on Aquinas and Locke may find these initial chapters difficult to follow.The argument becomes easier to follow in part 2, which provides Di Ceglie's own interpretation of Aquinas. The key third chapter explores Aquinas's definition of faith as "an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine Truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God" (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9). It demonstrates that while for Aquinas faith involves firm propositional belief, its certitude derives not from believers' assessment of signs that God has revealed the articles of faith but from their free choice—itself a gift of grace—to embrace those articles. More precisely, in cases of "formed" faith, this choice is motivated by supernatural love for God (charity). Charity's role in Aquinas's religious epistemology is [End Page 547] highlighted in two subsequent chapters. Inter alia, Di Ceglie charges that faith is meritorious principally due to its grounds in charity rather than because the articles of faith are not evidently true. He further claims that Aquinas understood "unformed" faith as merely "faith commonly so called"—that is, natural belief in propositions because one judges that they are testified to by a competent authority. Accordingly, unformed faith lacks perfect confidence because it is merely based on probabilistic evidence that God has revealed the articles of faith, rather than on a strong, loving will to trust God. More generally, the certitude of one's faith is proportionate to the perfection of one's charity.Having developed a reading of Aquinas's religious epistemology that stresses the distinction between faith and reason, in part 3 Di Ceglie considers their positive relationship. First, he attempts to reconcile the apparently opposing views that Aquinas's philosophy is purely an exercise of natural reason, and that his philosophical work was influenced by his Christian faith. Broadly, the charity that grounds formed faith also inspires and enhances rational investigation, although philosophical arguments cannot presume faith's truth. Believers with formed faith, however, should reject positions that contradict faith and seek to revise their philosophical reasoning accordingly. The final chapter argues that Christian faith affords a better position from which to engage in rational reflection than atheism or agnosticism. Among other advantages, faith... (shrink)

Christian theology is one of the most neglected areas of Leibniz’s thought. It is a subject that engaged his attention throughout his intellectual career. He seems to have been very well informed about the main currents of theological opinion in his own time, and to have had an extensive knowledge of historic doctrinal positions. He left behind a wealth of letters and unpublished papers discussing topics in revealed theology; but this resource for understanding both his own thought and the history (...) of theology at the dawn of the Enlightenment remains largely unmined. The Academy edition of Leibniz’s works includes as yet no systematic project for the publication of his theological papers—the largest class of his papers—although important treatments of theological subjects are finding their way into series I and VI. Gaston Grua surveyed and assembled a large quantity of theological texts, but these are organized around Grua’s interest in Leibniz’s theodicy, so that Leibniz’s views on topics such as grace, predestination, and theological method are represented much more richly than other topics in revealed theology. Another topic much discussed in the secondary literature is Leibniz’s treatment of eucharistic theology, which has attracted attention because it is involved both in his negotiations about reunion of the churches and in some of his major discussions of issues about corporeal substance. But other central topics of Christian theology have received much less attention in the secondary literature; and this is true in particular of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, even though they are rich in metaphysical resonance and Leibniz had quite a lot to say about them. (shrink)

In the work of the Cistercian Garnerio de Rochefort, active in the second half of the 12th century, we find the formulation of a psychological doctrine based on the interweaving of the Augustinian model of videre and the Neoplatonic principle of a scalar order of the faculties of the soul. The idea of a visual‑cognitive ascent of the soul is used in the direction of an overtly mystical approach, typical of monastic spiritual theology. For Garnerio, the process of man’s inner (...) refinement towards ecstatic‑cognitive assimilation to the divine coincides with a movement of psycho‑gnoseological progression from sense to intelligence, from the external sight of the sensible world to the spiritual one. The culmination is a direct intuition of the gaze with which God sees and understands all things, reachable only by intelligence. Of course, this vision will only be fully realised in the state of future bliss. However, during their earthly life, some men have been made capable, by divine gift, of approaching this summit of knowledge in an episodic and always imperfect way. For Garnerio, man’s turning to God is therefore conceivable only through the joint concurrence of grace and a perfective movement of the soul requiring an entry into himself in order to go supra se, to a place where he will be with God and in God. (shrink)

An extraordinary book. Not only does it equal, if not surpass, all previous philosophical dictionaries in the amount and breadth of the material covered, it is full of the life of contemporary issues. Abbagnano is a master of economic exposition, and a careful organizer and editor. Four unique features deserve notice: The historical background of terms is given fully, with detailed bibliography; non-technical terms are included, e.g., names of schools, with historical reports; American thought is represented to a degree far (...) beyond that of any other European dictionary; Abbagnano has taken a very comprehensive view of philosophy, which takes in the social sciences as well as the entire spectrum of the usual academic classifications. And finally, the book is a pleasure to read, being gracefully written and free of the encumbrances and short-cuts common to most dictionaries.--C. D. (shrink)

Are horror films immoral? Gianluca Di Muzio argues that horror films of a certain kind are immoral because they undermine the reactive attitudes that are responsible for human agents being disposed to respond compassionately to instances of victimization. I begin with this argument as one instance of what I call the Argument from Reactive Attitudes (ARA), and I argue that Di Muzio’s attempt to identify what is morally suspect about horror films must be revised to provide the most (...) persuasive interpretation of the ARA. I then argue that the ARA provides a compelling standard for evaluating the moral permissibility of creating and viewing horror films, yet I note that it is an exceedingly difficult practical task evaluating the risk that these films create for our reactive attitudes. My conclusion is that the ARA provides a useful way or orienting ourselves to the complicated details of evaluating the moral status of horror films. (shrink)

In “The Immorality of Horror Films” (International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20:2 [2006], 278), Gianluca Di Muzio argues that it is immoral to produce, distribute, or watch so-called “slasher” or “gorefest” films. Though I am sympathetic, I don’t believe that his arguments warrant his conclusion. In this paper, I will respond to Di Muzio. In particular, I will focus on what I take to be his core argument, which is based on the idea that these films discourage morally (...) appropriate reactions to human suffering. Then I will examine two objections to Di Muzio’s position which he himself raises and dismisses, and I will argue that Di Muzio does not adequately refute either of the objections. Finally, I will conclude with some sympathetic remarks, and briefly consider what avenues we might pursue in order to argue for the immorality of at least some horror films. (shrink)

The doctrine of friendship with God is one of the most classical in the Christian tradition. Building on the teachings of the Fathers of the Church and of the Middle Ages, the Theology of the Siglo de Oro explored its meaning in greater depth, stimulated also by the Decree on Justification of the Council of Trent, which places this theme in the context of its reflection on grace. Outstanding among the authors of that epoch was the Jesuit, F. Toledo (...) , Master of the Roman College; the well-articulated reflection, which he offers in his Commentary on St. John examines in depth the relationship between friendship with God and the doctrine of Grace, and includes many ideas which are still of great value and interest for contemporary theology. (shrink)

In “The Immorality of Horror Films,” philosopher and film scholar Gianluca Di Muzio proposes an analytic argument that aims to prove horror narratives, particularly slashers, unethical. His Argument from Reactive Attitudes contests slashers encourage pleasurable responses towards depictions of torture and death, which is possible only by suspending compassionate reactions. Doing so degrades sympathy and empathy, causing desensitization. This article will argue Di Muzio’s ARA, while valuable to discussion of art horror and morbidity, fails to meet its intended (...) aim. The ARA contains structural flaws in its logic, compounded by reliance on insufficient evidence. Additionally, Di Muzio does not adequately consider or rebut prominent aesthetic concerns, including ontological and moral distance of representations. Lastly, the argument utilizes a flawed classificatory schema that undermines its primary goal. Even narrowly confined to slashers, the ARA cannot explain alternative reasons for engaging with horror, nor does it account for those nuanced slasher works designed to foster compassion. The project concludes by offering a modified ARA with greater potential to accurately analyze the interrelation between art horror and morality. (shrink)

In addition to providing an account of the empirical facts of language, a theory that aspires to account for language as a biologically based human faculty should seek a graceful integration of linguistic phenomena with what is known about other human cognitive capacities and about the character of brain computation. The present article compares the theoretical stance of biolinguistics (Chomsky 2005, Di Sciullo and Boeckx 2011) with a constraint-based Parallel Architecture approach to the language faculty (Jackendoff 2002, Culicover and Jackendoff (...) 2005). The issues considered include the necessity of redundancy in the lexicon and the rule system, the ubiquity of recursion in cognition, derivational vs. constraint-based formalisms, the relation between lexical items and grammatical rules, the roles of phonology and semantics in the grammar, the combinatorial character of thought in humans and nonhumans, the interfaces between language, thought, and vision, and the possible course of evolution of the language faculty. In each of these areas, the Parallel Architecture offers a superior account both of linguistic facts and of the relation of language to the rest of the mind/brain. (shrink)

Abstrak: Diskusi mengenai hubungan Ekaristi dengan hidup sehari- hari masih terus berlangsung hingga hari ini, baik di kalangan para teolog maupun umat beriman pada umumnya. Kiasan yang sering di gunakan di Indonesia untuk melukiskan hubungan tersebut adalah al tar dan pasar. Yang menjadi bahan diskusi ialah masih adanya pan- dangan dikotomis yang memisahkan keduanya. Tulisan ini ingin mem- beri sumbangan kepada diskusi tentang tema tersebut dari pemikiran teologis Karl Rahner (1904–1984). Rahner menunjukkan bahwa pemahaman tentang rahmat sebagai pemberian diri Allah (...) yang senantiasa di- berikan dan dianugerahkan kepada umat manusia dan sejarahnya tidak memperkenankan pemisahan dikotomis semacam itu. Penulis mendekati permasalahan tersebut dengan pertama-tama menggali pemikiran sakramental Rahner, kemudian memperdalamnya dalam teologi Ekaristi. Dari alur pemikiran ini dibahas teologi Rahner yang senantiasa berciri pastoral, yaitu menghubungkan makna Ekaristi dengan kehidupan sehari- hari. Bagi Rahner, Ekaristi adalah sakramen sehari-hari. Dalam pengertian ini, kehidupan sehari-hari orang Kristiani mestinya merupakan perpanjangan dari hidup sehari-hari Kristus sendiri yang dirayakan dan diterima dalam Ekaristi. Kata-kata Kunci: Ekaristi, hidup sehari-hari, teologi sakramental, altar dan pasar, sakramen sehari-hari. Abstract: Theologians, as well as Christians in general continue dis- cussing more deeply correlation between Eucharistic celebration and one’s daily life. Yet, many are still employing a dichotomous approach between altar and marketplace. This article is intended to contribute to the discussion, especially by presenting important theological insights of Karl Rahner (1904-1984) who would not allow such a dichotomy. Rahner presents a creative theology of grace primarily as God’s Self-gift, continuously offered to every single human being throughout our his- tory. We will begin with the presentation of Rahner’s sacramental theology, followed by the theology of the Eucharist. Rahner’s theological thought, it is argued, remains pastoral in character, that relates meaning of the Eucharist to day-to-day Christian living and practices. For Rahner, the Eucharist is a sacrament of the everyday. In this sense, the Christian’s daily life should be the extension of the daily life of Christ celebrated and received in the Eucharist. Keywords: Eucharist,dailylife,sacramentaltheology,altarandmarketplace, sacrament of the everyday. (shrink)

Hadiths that have been discussed in this paper consist of narrations regarding divine attributes and having some problematic meanings between supporters of Bişr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī. These narrations were mostly accepted denounced (munkar) by Bişr al-Marīsī and his sopporters due to having an anthropormophist and corporealist content about God. They rejected divine attributes according to their understanding of God based on incomparability (tanzīh) which provided by Mutazilite approach towards divine attributes even though they conveyed some features of Ahl al-Ra’y. (...) They found contradicted of attributing human features to God based on their tanzīh understanding, therefore, they interpreted such this kind of narra-tions in terms of their approach or rejected at all. At the other hand, a hard Hadith scholar Uth-man al-Darimi believed that one should accept divine attributes as they are in the Qur’an and Sunna. According to his belief, he considered the explicit meanings of the narrations without interpretation of divine attributes, and based on his perpective he denied Bişr al-Marīsī and his supporters’ interpretations claiming they would cause divesting God of all attributes (ta‘tīl). He argues that these narrations should be taken into considerations based on their explicit mea-nings. The discussions on these hadiths are important due to showing different approaches of scholars from the schools of Ahl al-Ra’y and the ones from Ahl al-Hadith towards the hadith du-ring the period when the main Hadith works were collected. Discussions on the narrations stu-died in this paper reveal two schools’ understandings of divine issues, their approaches to divi-ne attributes, as well inform us their perspectives of hadith in general.Summary: The present paper examines the debates between ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894) and the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) on the divine attributes mentioned in some hadiths in the period when the main hadith books were composed (i.e., III/IXth century). These debates that took place between the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra’y concern the un-derstanding and interpretation of the hadiths in a certain way.It could be stated that the debates focus on how the hadiths should be understood, or whether it is the explicit meaning of the words or the possible methaphorical meanings beyond them that should be considered.It is worth briefly introducing the parties who discussed the hadiths studied here. The aforementioned discussions about some hadith narrations are between the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, one of the important figures of the Ahl al-Hadith who wrote a separate work on these hadiths. This work was written as a rejection of the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and his two students on the attributes of God and some issues regarding hadith.Bishr al-Marīsī was regarded as an important scholar of Kalam who received fiqh education from Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798). He is a scholar of Ahl al-Ra’y who made scientific dis-cussions with many scholars including Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 204/820). He was on the council of the Caliph Al-Mamūn (d. 218/833) and had a significant role in the adoption of the idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān (khalq al-Qurʾān).Uthmān al-Dārimī,on the other hand, was a scholar of Ahl al-Hadith who learned ha-dith from the authorities of his era such as Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 237/851), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Having visited all the important cities for the training of hadith, he learned the hadiths and conveyed them.With the understanding of proving the divine attributes and the opposition of the misin-terpretation of the narratives related to them, the groups advocating the appropriation of these lines in accordance with the understanding of incomparability (tanzīh) have complied the works since the first period. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the rejection of the divine attributes by Mu'tazila was influential in the emergence of the criticism literature of the Ahl al-Hadith and many authors wrote works in this direction.Regarding a narration by Abū Hurayra, an opponent reports that this narration gives the impression that God has the eyes and ears as we know. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī reports that this hadith proves sight and hearing not the eyes and ear organs. He indicates that God has no like by no means. Therefore, it is slanderous to refer the claim that Allah is made of organs to the Ahl al-Hadith. Abū Dāwūd states that with this hadith the attributes of sight and hearing for God are proved and Jahmiyya’s denial of the divine attributes are rejected.The opponent also considered Abū Hurayra's narration referring to the Prophet: "Faith is from Yemen, wisdom is from Yemen! I feel the breath of your Lord from Yemen!" as denounced (munkar). Because, according to Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions, breath can only come from those with an abdominal cavity, and Allah is free from it. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the opponent misunderstood. What is meant here is the wind that blows from Yemen and comforts people. In the context of this narration, we see that supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī evaluate the narrative literally, while ʿUthmān al-Dārimī interpret the narrative.Regarding the narration, "You can not approach Allah with something more virtuous than what comes out of it (the Qur'ān)" Ibn al-Saljī reports that Mushabbiha understands this as one with an abdominal cavity and from whom speech comes out. This understanding is in-valid since God is "samad" in the sense that He has no void. With this hadith, it is meant that the Qur'ān comes out of Allah’s presence rather than Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the real aim of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny God's attribute of speech. There is no doubt that the Qur'ān comes from Him, and those who do not accept it merely deny His attribute of speech.Attributed to Ibn Abbas; The meaning of "yamīn Allah" (the right hand of Allah) in narration "Black Stone (al-ḥajar al-aswad) is the right hand of Allah on earth, handshakes with the people" is not the right hand that we know according to Ibn al-Saljī, it is blessing and grace of Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who acknowledges that Black Stone is not meant to be a hand, the purpose of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny the two hands mentioned in the verses and ha-diths about Allah with invalid interpretations.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who criticized that Ibn al-Saljī quoted from another narration which Ibn Abbās heard from the Prophet, says that such poor narrations should not be spread. In addition, he points out that Ibn al-Saljī's interpretation is ugly and he criticizes it. Because Allah who is mentioned in the narrative is depicted as a young man with curly hair in a green suit. Such a narration is also an untrustworthy narration as it contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who made this assessment of the narration, rejects the com-ments that the opponent made about the narration. According to the opponent, the phrase "I have come to Allah" means "to come into the presence of Allah in the Garden of Eden." Accor-ding to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī’s understanding, such complicated hadiths should not be only narra-ted.About the narration that are based on the Prophet and he does not know the answer to what he has come to know of himself, then he feels the coolness of his fingers as he puts his hand on his back and learns everything, the opponent evaluates the following: He was not Allah who came to the Prophet, but a well-behaved angel who was being directed by Allah and he was the angel who put his hand. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī rejects this interpretation of that oppo-nent. This comment is also contrary to other authentic hadiths. After he refused to the com-ment of the opponent about relevant narration, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī stated that he could not trust this comment on the basis of the authentic narrations he mentioned.Salaf scholars have preferred to be silent in this regard, as it is seen among the most difficult subjects to talk about divine attributes. However, subsequent generations have held dif-ferent paths in this regard. The basic approaches to understanding the divine attributes can be summarized in three main titles: tafwīd, tashbīh, and ta’wīl. Tafwīd is the path adopted by the early salaf scholars and means to leaving the knowledge about Allah’s entity and attributes to His knowledge. Tashbīh means to compare Allah to the created or the created to Allah. Ta'wīl is to interpret the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths that give the impression that Allah is like the crea-tures with semantics and rational deduction. The ones who deny the adjectives are called as Muʿattila and those who prove their attributes are called as Sifatiyya. According to Ahl al-Ra’y, it is necessary to appropriately make interpretation (ta'wīl) of the attributes giving the impression of anthropomorphism in terms of the dictionary. In the divine attributes, Muʿtazila advoca-ted the incomparability (tanzīh), whereas Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya adopted interpretation in accordance with incomparability. Mushabbiha and the Wahhābī-Salafī understanding has also taken the expressions regarding divine attributes with their explicit meanings.The debate between the scholars who lived in the ages II/VIII and III/IX, when the most important works are composed in the science of hadith, is important in that it is the first turn. In addition to this, the debate also contains important information on the approach to the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths, in that it shows two basic approaches, one of which represents the school of Ahl al-Ra’y, and the other represents the school of Ahl al-Hadith.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī generally advocates adhering to the explicit meaning of the narra-tion, while Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions criticize the narration labeling it as denied (mun-kar) or making an interpretation. On rare occasions, the places where ʿUthmān al-Dārimī re-jects the narration and makes interpretation, or where Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions de-fend the narrative can be seen.Interpretations made by Bishr al-Marīsī on the problematic narratives have influenced on the next scholars. Alongside Muʿtazilite scholars such as al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), his interpretations have been quoted by Sunni scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).The fact that the truth can be put forward in the science of hadith, which is based on the narration, does not favor one of the "narration" and "ra’y", it should be kept in mind that both of these depend on the proper and balanced use of both. To reveal the truth, the narration is in need of the opinion and the opinion (ra’y) is in need of the narration. Narration and opinion sho-uld be seen as complementary elements, not each other's opponents. (shrink)

Personnalité et irrationalité chez Merleau-PontyUne personnalité est l’ensemble des traits et des qualités propres à une personne spécifique. Il s’agit d’un être humain concret, considéré dans sa totalité et distinct des autres individus. Merleau-Ponty s’est peu intéressé au concept de “personnalité”. Mais il fait référence au concept de totalité pour un individu lorsqu’il parle d’ “existence” ou d’ “être humain”. Grâce à la clarification du concept merleau-pontien de personnalité, je voudrais démontrer ce qui suit : la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la (...) structure caractérise la personnalité humaine comme un tout. Cette idée est héritée du “personnalisme” de la psychologie française inauguré par Ribot. La personnalité ainsi définie possède une rationalité téléologique (un objet visé). Cependant, lorsque Merleau-Ponty propose plus tard le concept d’“institution”, il souligne que toute signification de l’expérience humaine se fonde sur une expérience particulière et sur un point de vue concret ayant valeur de dimension, de niveau, ou encore sur un critère qui donne un sens à l’expérience suivante. S’il en est ainsi, les êtres humains doivent posséder une irrationalité fondamentale au coeur de leur personnalité ; irrationalité désigne une attitude attachée à une expérience particulière ou à un point de vue singulier. Les hommes peuvent “ré-instituer” leur expérience, c’est-à-dire abolir et transformer une dimension, un niveau ou un critère de l’expérience en y intégrant d’autres points de vue à travers leurs relations intersubjectives. Ils gagnent ainsi en nuance et en objectivité. Cependant, ils ne parviennent jamais à une rationalité totale si celle-ci se définit par une pensée totalement objective, universelle et non située, capable de voir le monde de nulle part. La ré-institution pourrait aussi entraîner une rupture dans la personnalité de quelqu’un et la rendre complexe et multiple, sans être pathologique pour autant.Personalità e irrazionalità in Merleau-PontyLa personalità è l’insieme delle qualità e dei tratti peculiari di una certa persona. È un essere umano concreto, preso nella sua interezza e distinto dagli altri individui. Merleau-Ponty non si è mai occupato molto del concetto di “personalità”. Ma si è riferito a tale concetto di totalità di un individuo sotto i nomi di “esistenza” o “essere umano”. Chiarendo la concezione merleau-pontiana della “personalità”, intendo sostenere che la filosofia della struttura di Merleau-Ponty caratterizza la personalità umana come un tutto unificato. Quest’idea è un’eredità del “personalismo” della psicologia francese inaugurata da Ribot. La personalità definita come tale ha una razionalità teleologica (orientata ad un obiettivo). Tuttavia, quando Merleau-Ponty propose più tardi il concetto di “istituzione”, sottolineò più di quanto avesse fatto precedentemente che perché ogni esperienza umana abbia un significato occore stabilire una particolare esperienza ed un punto di vista concreto quale dimensione, livello, o criterio che dia significato all’esperienza successiva. Se così è, gli esseri umani devono avere una fondamentale irrazionalità nel profondo della loro personalità, intendendo con irrazionalità un atteggiamento che è legato ad una particolare esperienza o punto di vista. Gli esseri umani possono “re-istituire” la loro esperienza, ovvero, riconsiderare una dimensione, un livello, o un criterio dell’esperienza attraverso l’integrazione degli altri punti di vista grazie alle loro relazioni intersoggettive. Guadagnano, così, sfumature e obiettività. Tuttavia, non possono mai realizzare la razionalità completa se per razionalità s’intende il pensiero completamente oggettivo, universale, imparziale, che guarda il mondo da nessun luogo. E la re-istituzione potrebbe creare una fessura decisiva nell’identità personale di un uomo, e rendere tale personalità complessa e “multipla,” anche se non necessariamente patologica. (shrink)

Personnalité et irrationalité chez Merleau-PontyUne personnalité est l’ensemble des traits et des qualités propres à une personne spécifique. Il s’agit d’un être humain concret, considéré dans sa totalité et distinct des autres individus. Merleau-Ponty s’est peu intéressé au concept de “personnalité”. Mais il fait référence au concept de totalité pour un individu lorsqu’il parle d’ “existence” ou d’ “être humain”. Grâce à la clarification du concept merleau-pontien de personnalité, je voudrais démontrer ce qui suit : la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la (...) structure caractérise la personnalité humaine comme un tout. Cette idée est héritée du “personnalisme” de la psychologie française inauguré par Ribot. La personnalité ainsi définie possède une rationalité téléologique (un objet visé). Cependant, lorsque Merleau-Ponty propose plus tard le concept d’“institution”, il souligne que toute signification de l’expérience humaine se fonde sur une expérience particulière et sur un point de vue concret ayant valeur de dimension, de niveau, ou encore sur un critère qui donne un sens à l’expérience suivante. S’il en est ainsi, les êtres humains doivent posséder une irrationalité fondamentale au coeur de leur personnalité ; irrationalité désigne une attitude attachée à une expérience particulière ou à un point de vue singulier. Les hommes peuvent “ré-instituer” leur expérience, c’est-à-dire abolir et transformer une dimension, un niveau ou un critère de l’expérience en y intégrant d’autres points de vue à travers leurs relations intersubjectives. Ils gagnent ainsi en nuance et en objectivité. Cependant, ils ne parviennent jamais à une rationalité totale si celle-ci se définit par une pensée totalement objective, universelle et non située, capable de voir le monde de nulle part. La ré-institution pourrait aussi entraîner une rupture dans la personnalité de quelqu’un et la rendre complexe et multiple, sans être pathologique pour autant.Personalità e irrazionalità in Merleau-PontyLa personalità è l’insieme delle qualità e dei tratti peculiari di una certa persona. È un essere umano concreto, preso nella sua interezza e distinto dagli altri individui. Merleau-Ponty non si è mai occupato molto del concetto di “personalità”. Ma si è riferito a tale concetto di totalità di un individuo sotto i nomi di “esistenza” o “essere umano”. Chiarendo la concezione merleau-pontiana della “personalità”, intendo sostenere che la filosofia della struttura di Merleau-Ponty caratterizza la personalità umana come un tutto unificato. Quest’idea è un’eredità del “personalismo” della psicologia francese inaugurata da Ribot. La personalità definita come tale ha una razionalità teleologica (orientata ad un obiettivo). Tuttavia, quando Merleau-Ponty propose più tardi il concetto di “istituzione”, sottolineò più di quanto avesse fatto precedentemente che perché ogni esperienza umana abbia un significato occore stabilire una particolare esperienza ed un punto di vista concreto quale dimensione, livello, o criterio che dia significato all’esperienza successiva. Se così è, gli esseri umani devono avere una fondamentale irrazionalità nel profondo della loro personalità, intendendo con irrazionalità un atteggiamento che è legato ad una particolare esperienza o punto di vista. Gli esseri umani possono “re-istituire” la loro esperienza, ovvero, riconsiderare una dimensione, un livello, o un criterio dell’esperienza attraverso l’integrazione degli altri punti di vista grazie alle loro relazioni intersoggettive. Guadagnano, così, sfumature e obiettività. Tuttavia, non possono mai realizzare la razionalità completa se per razionalità s’intende il pensiero completamente oggettivo, universale, imparziale, che guarda il mondo da nessun luogo. E la re-istituzione potrebbe creare una fessura decisiva nell’identità personale di un uomo, e rendere tale personalità complessa e “multipla,” anche se non necessariamente patologica. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty, la passivité et la scienceJe soutiens qu’il y a plus en jeu dans l’intérêt de Merleau-Ponty pour la science qu’une simple dialectique entre disciplines. C’est parce que son évolutionméthodologique le conduit à trouver dans la science un moyen spécifique d’approfondir ses recherches ontologiques, que celle-ci hante de plus en plus sa philosophie. En effet, dans le chapitre « champ phénoménal » de la Phénoménologie de la perception, il est possible de rapprocher certains aspects de son défi méthodologique et l’idée (...) selon laquelle la philosophie tient son origine d’une conscience réflexive, active et autonome dans son ensemble. Je lie cela aux problèmes de la passivité de telle sorte que la science apparaisse comme une façon de saisir la réflexion non pas comme autonome, mais comme une opération du champ phénomenal, comme réflexion radicale. Grâce à l’analyse critique des recherches récentes sur le génome, je montre ensuite commentl’embryologie peut nous aider à conceptualiser la vie comme un champ phénoménal, c’est-à-dire comme un champ qui engendre ce même genre d’opérations qui caractérisent aussi la phénoménalité. Cela nous conduit à voir la phénomenologie non plus comme une réflexion de survol sur les phénomènes, mais plutôt comme une réflexion radicale qui se realise à travers un phénoménalité plus « ancienne », qui appartient à la vie ellemême. Cela ouvre également des perspectives sur quelques problèmes difficiles de la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty; ceux-ci sont abordés d’une manière nouvelle, grâce au rapprochement de sa première philosophie et de la science actuelle.Merleau-Ponty, la passività e la scienzaRitengo che, nell’interesse che Merleau-Ponty rivolge alla scienza, vi sia in gioco qualcosa di più del semplice confronto dialettico con un’altra disciplina. Il motivo è che il suo impegno metodologico finisce per individuare nella scienza una speciale risorsa per l’indagine di quelle profonde questioni ontologiche che investono in modo crescente la sua filosofia. Intendo argomentare tale ipotesi, connettendo dei passi del capitolo di Fenomenologia della percezione “Il campo fenomenico” con la sua sfida metodologica all’idea che la filosofia abbia inizio da una coscienza riflessiva autonoma e interamente attiva. Collego questo alle questioni della passività in un modo che rivela la scienza come una potenziale risorsa per comprendere la riflessione non come autonoma, bensì in quanto operazione di e nel campo fenomenico – come riflessione radicale. Poi, attraverso un’analisi critica dei risultati recenti riguardanti il DNA regolatore, mostrocome l’attuale embriologia può aiutarci a concettualizzare la vita come un campo fenomenico che implicitamente produce i tipi di operazioni rivelatrici distintive della fenomenalità. Questo ci permette di collocare la fenomenologia non semplicemente come una riflessione dall’alto sui fenomeni, ma come una riflessione radicale che opera grazie ad una “più antica” fenomenalità della vita. Questo ci fornisce degli spunti su alcune difficili questioni nella filosofia dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty, suggerendo un nuovo percorso che giunga a queste combinando il primo periodo della sua filosofia con la scienza recente. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty, la passivité et la scienceJe soutiens qu’il y a plus en jeu dans l’intérêt de Merleau-Ponty pour la science qu’une simple dialectique entre disciplines. C’est parce que son évolutionméthodologique le conduit à trouver dans la science un moyen spécifique d’approfondir ses recherches ontologiques, que celle-ci hante de plus en plus sa philosophie. En effet, dans le chapitre « champ phénoménal » de la Phénoménologie de la perception, il est possible de rapprocher certains aspects de son défi méthodologique et l’idée (...) selon laquelle la philosophie tient son origine d’une conscience réflexive, active et autonome dans son ensemble. Je lie cela aux problèmes de la passivité de telle sorte que la science apparaisse comme une façon de saisir la réflexion non pas comme autonome, mais comme une opération du champ phénomenal, comme réflexion radicale. Grâce à l’analyse critique des recherches récentes sur le génome, je montre ensuite commentl’embryologie peut nous aider à conceptualiser la vie comme un champ phénoménal, c’est-à-dire comme un champ qui engendre ce même genre d’opérations qui caractérisent aussi la phénoménalité. Cela nous conduit à voir la phénomenologie non plus comme une réflexion de survol sur les phénomènes, mais plutôt comme une réflexion radicale qui se realise à travers un phénoménalité plus « ancienne », qui appartient à la vie ellemême. Cela ouvre également des perspectives sur quelques problèmes difficiles de la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty; ceux-ci sont abordés d’une manière nouvelle, grâce au rapprochement de sa première philosophie et de la science actuelle.Merleau-Ponty, la passività e la scienzaRitengo che, nell’interesse che Merleau-Ponty rivolge alla scienza, vi sia in gioco qualcosa di più del semplice confronto dialettico con un’altra disciplina. Il motivo è che il suo impegno metodologico finisce per individuare nella scienza una speciale risorsa per l’indagine di quelle profonde questioni ontologiche che investono in modo crescente la sua filosofia. Intendo argomentare tale ipotesi, connettendo dei passi del capitolo di Fenomenologia della percezione “Il campo fenomenico” con la sua sfida metodologica all’idea che la filosofia abbia inizio da una coscienza riflessiva autonoma e interamente attiva. Collego questo alle questioni della passività in un modo che rivela la scienza come una potenziale risorsa per comprendere la riflessione non come autonoma, bensì in quanto operazione di e nel campo fenomenico – come riflessione radicale. Poi, attraverso un’analisi critica dei risultati recenti riguardanti il DNA regolatore, mostrocome l’attuale embriologia può aiutarci a concettualizzare la vita come un campo fenomenico che implicitamente produce i tipi di operazioni rivelatrici distintive della fenomenalità. Questo ci permette di collocare la fenomenologia non semplicemente come una riflessione dall’alto sui fenomeni, ma come una riflessione radicale che opera grazie ad una “più antica” fenomenalità della vita. Questo ci fornisce degli spunti su alcune difficili questioni nella filosofia dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty, suggerendo un nuovo percorso che giunga a queste combinando il primo periodo della sua filosofia con la scienza recente. (shrink)

In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two (...) important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education. (shrink)

In the opening essay of The Muses, Nancy asks what force disperses Art into a plurality of arts, and what simultaneously holds them together in the unity of Art, through this very dispersal. The idea of Art, as a plurality of irreducible singularities that nevertheless commune, developed in the essay, is a precursor to the ontology of Being Singular Plural, widely considered one of his most important works. The claim in The Muses is not only that art itself has to (...) be understood as a unity of a plurality of singularities, but that it is a privileged site for the revealing of the singular plural of being. The following essay explores Nancy’s ontology of art, which is simultaneously a way of understanding being in terms of art, by tracing it back to Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the sense of being in terms of the “chiasm” (the touching-touched) in The Visible and the Invisible is a crucial source for Nancy’s pluralist ontology. The turn to Merleau-Ponty is framed as a way of emphasizing that Nancy remains committed to a philosophical or ontological idea of art (despite his own criticisms of the very idea) against those who would like to separate his pluralist idea of art from any reference to the question of the meaning of “being.” The argument is that radical pluralism requires, paradoxically, an ontology, just as the affirmation of the irreducible plurality of singular arts requires a notion of Art. Dans l’essai qui ouvre Les muses, Nancy se demande quelle force disperse l’Art dans les arts et retient simultanément leur dispersion dans l’unité de l’Art. L’idée d’Art en tant qu’une pluralité irréductible de singularités qui communient malgré ou grâce à cette pluralité, telle qu’elle est développée dans cet essai, constitue un précurseur de l’ontologie présentée dans Être singulier pluriel, un des ouvrages les plus importants de Nancy. Cet article explore l’ontologie de l’art nancéenne, qui est aussi à la fois une façon de comprendre l’être en tant qu’art, en en retraçant les racines chez Merleau-Ponty. Je soutiens que la compréhension du sens de l’être comme chiasme (touchant-touché) chez le Merleau-Ponty du Visible et l’invisible est une source décisive de l’ontologie pluraliste de Nancy. Le recours à Merleau-Ponty permet de souligner le fait que Nancy demeure attaché à une idée philosophique ou ontologique de l’art, malgré ses propres critiques de l’idée même. Cette interprétation va à l’encontre de celles qui chercheraient à détacher le concept pluraliste d’art chez Nancy de toute référence à la question du sens de l’« être ». Ma contention est que le pluralisme radical requiert, paradoxalement, une ontologie, de la même façon que l’affirmation de l’irréductible pluralité des arts singuliers requiert une notion d’Art.Nel saggio che apre Le muse, Nancy si domanda quale forza disperda l’Arte in una pluralità di arti, e cosa al contempo mantenga queste ultime legate nell’unità dell’Arte a dispetto di questa dispersione stessa. L’idea di Arte, sviluppata in questo saggio, come pluralità di singolarità irriducibili che nonostante tutto si trovano a contatto e in comunicazione, prelude all’ontologia di Essere singolare plurale, tra le opere più importanti di Nancy. Ne Le muse Nancy sostiene non soltanto che l’arte in sé debba essere concepita come l’unità di una pluralità di singolarità, ma anche che essa sia un luogo privilegiato per il rivelarsi del singolare plurale dell’essere. Questo articolo esplora l’ontologia dell’arte di Nancy, che è al contempo un modo di comprendere l’essere nei termini dell’arte, attraverso un richiamo a Merleau-Ponty. Mi propongo così di mostrare che la concezione del senso dell’essere di Merleau-Ponty nei termini del “chiasmo” (il “toccante-toccato”), espressa ne Il visibile e l’invisibile, sia una fonte cruciale per l’ontologia pluralista di Nancy. Il richiamo a Merleau-Ponty è volto a sottolineare come Nancy rimanga fedele a un’idea filosofica o ontologica di arte (nonostante le sue stesse critiche a questa idea), in opposizione a coloro che vorrebbero separare la sua idea pluralista di arte da qualunque riferimento alla questione del significato dell’“essere”. La mia tesi è che il pluralismo radicale richieda, paradossalmente, un’ontologia, esattamente come l’affermazione della pluralità irriducibile delle arti singolari richiede la nozione di Arte. (shrink)